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This paper examined the social and political background of the rise of new political
leadership in the Presidential election of December 2002, analyzing voting outcome
that reflected styles of life, thinking, and behavior of young generation. This paper con-
tends that generational effect on voting was very significant as to break the rigidity of
political support market consolidated by cleavage structure such as regional division in
South Korea. Behind the marginal victory of President Roh Moo Hyun by a 2.2% over
the competitor there existed a strong support of young generation that had developed
far different cultural sentiments and ideological orientation from old generation. The
young generation projected its generational mission on Mr. Roh to reject three main
legacies, i.e., state centrism, authoritarianism, and growth-first ideology. This paper
analyzes characteristics of his power brokers in the Transition Commission and politi-
cal supporters, arguing that the progressive attitude such as pro-union, pro-distribu-
tion, and anti-elite approaches will receive severe attack from the conservative group,
i.e., business and the upper class. Whether his regime successfully realizes the expecta-
tion of young generation entirely relies upon the toleration of the conservative group of
the substitution of old social order and value system with new ones. It needs time to
wait and see how his regime will successfully manage contested terrains where new
ones are emerging and conflicting with old ones.
IS IT A REVOLUTION?
On January 1, 2003, during the New Year ceremony in the Sociology
Department, Seoul National University, a well-known senior alumnus, for-
mer Minister and director of a leading newspaper, confessed with deep
despair that the election outcome had driven the country to impasses in
every respect, and that the resulting general crisis would ruin the founda-
tion of Korean society. He added with a powerless voice that we, the senior
and old elite groups, had lost in managing the society that was still thirsty
for wisdom, experience, and a sense of balance and justice. His confession
was the real expression of being kicked out of the center of politics and soci-
ety. For a while, participants in the ceremony were overwhelmed by a
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gloomy mood.
The next speaker, a retiree and Honors Professor, cynically questioned
whether it was a real revolution. The question was aimed at the despair and
pessimistic sentiments that had swept the old generation like a typhoon
after Roh Moo Hyun’s marginal victory, and the consequent shift of power
to a handful of nameless people, whose common background was the oppo-
sition movements of the 1980s and the civil social movements of the 1990s.
The Professor remarked that many people had declared it a revolution;
however, everything had remained the same as before. Police stations still
stood at the same place, he continued, and the old woman selling vegetables
and condiments still sits there at the same spot in the market near his house.
He again asked the audience: “Is it a revolution?”
It was in no respect a revolution, but there are significant changes that are
revolutionary. First, President Roh Moo Hyun has not been a member of the
so-called ‘gentlemen’s club’ in Korean society, i.e., the high society consist-
ing of the prestigious ruling class with property, political power, and high
status. Among a few qualifications, schooling is considered as the most
important entitlement of entering a gentlemen’s club, in such a society dom-
inated by credentialism. Although he is a man of ability in passing the state
examination and becoming a lawyer, his absence from the University is
regarded as a crucial shortcoming in a president. Second, the profiles of
members of the Transition Commission (TC) are striking, beyond expecta-
tion. Contrary to previous members, President Roh appointed relatively
unknown, but progressive professors from local universities and a few lead-
ers of civil social movements to leading positions. Activists in the labor and
feminist movements were included. TC began to take over the government
just after Roh’s victory, alerting people of the shift of political power to a
young, progressive, and inexperienced group. President Roh’s supporters
are young, bright individuals, and most of them are in their thirties and
early forties. His advisory group, the think-tank in the presidential cam-
paign, also includes professors of local universities who have been actively
involved in civil social movements for economic and social justice, and in
civil intervention in public affairs. Most members of the advisory group are
in their late forties and early fifties, and they could not have been leading
figures in TC under a different leadership. Members of TC set up the sched-
ules and procedures to review policy reports and government documents,
requiring all ministries to submit and present their policy drafts. If one
wants to know how TC activities startled both bureaucrats and citizens, it is
sufficient to imagine that high-positioned officials, in their late fifties and
fully experienced in their jobs, revised important policy measures in accor-
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dance with President Roh’s campaign pledges, and in the presence of inex-
perienced and relatively younger members of TC. For instance, Mr. Kim
Young Dae, a member of the social and labor section of TC, especially
attracts public attention, as he was not a leading figure in labor movements
and has less schooling (just below a high school education).
Distributional justice and the consolidation of Korea’s diplomatic power
in international relations are two pillars that reflect on President Roh’s lead-
ership and TC’s policy package from the two previous democratic govern-
ments. If one more is added, it is political reform, including the party sys-
tem, recruitment of new politicians, and general election rules to end the
regional cleavage between the East and the West. These are nothing new to
Korean electorates. However President Roh’s leadership is recognized as
based on his individual and public character. He is a real commoner with a
plain life-style, and was heavily involved in democratic opposition move-
ments in the 1980s, demonstrating progressive thinking and ideas on impor-
tant public affairs. Thus, it is predictable that the conservative ruling class
and leading elite groups are alert, and major presses that strongly and pub-
licly supported Lee Hoe Chang, the promising candidate in the presidential
election, are nervous. Chaebol firms and the FKI (Federation of Korean
Industry) resist the decision of TC to strengthen the reform of the firm gov-
ernance structure. Even the White House carefully expressed concern with
Roh’s sympathy for anti-American sentiment widely and rapidly spreading,
largely among the younger generations in Korea.
In January 2003 when TC announced policy platforms in important are-
nas, most economic indicators declined and generated ‘freezing effects.’
Housing markets suddenly plummeted due to TC’s plan to increase transfer
income tax; foreign direct investment also declined because of increasing
market uncertainty; the stock market has not been boosted; and consump-
tion was almost frozen by the strong market signal of economic downturn.
These symptoms are relatively rare during the period just before the inau-
guration of a new government that stimulated higher expectations among
the people.
What will happen during Roh’s government? Can President Roh
strengthen his political leadership enough to successfully accomplish his
projects? His political base is quite weak and vulnerable because of cleav-
ages and conflict inside the ruling party. He barely consolidates the support
of influential politicians in central politics. If conflict occurs between Roh’s
advisory group and leading politicians in the Democratic Party, then his
political power will dwindle. Can he endure the attacks and critiques of old
and conservative elite groups in implementing progressive policies favoring
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a new concept of social justice? These questions about Roh’s government
indicate that the election outcome and consequent rise of new leadership is
not a revolution, but is defined as an ordinary regime change. However, it
has generated a revolutionary like public atmosphere in Korea, which has
long been ruled by a conservative and older generation. Kim Dae Jung’s
government was not an exception. As far as senior personnel have
observed, the confessed ‘panic in their minds’ is not caused by the ordinal
and gradual regime change, but is tantamount to a rupture created by the
generational change and the ideological shift to more progressive positions
in politics and society.
CULTURAL STRIFE AND THE REVOLT OF THE YOUNG GENERATION
Even five years ago, it was unthinkable that a marginal, young politician
like Roh Moo Hyun could be a promising candidate in a presidential elec-
tion. The so-called ‘era of the three Kims’1 never allowed other politicians to
compete for presidency, so that the Korean people had long taken it for
granted that new political leaders would emerge after their retirement. The
last election of December 2002 coincided with this condition. As the end of
Kim Dae Jung’s regime approached, people became thirsty for a new leader-
ship with different characteristics from the three Kims. People become more
tired of charismatic figures surrounded by retainers, their self-righteous
political attitudes, and their eventual failure to satisfy inflated expectations.
Two Kim governments had always promised to terminate regional conflict
and political corruption through various reform measures, but with no sig-
nificant results. It is note-worthy that they could not break the limitations of
the political system through delaying progress toward substantive democra-
cy. In contrast to visible outcomes in other policy arenas, politics remained
virtually untouched during the past two democratic governments.
Major research explains three main characteristics of Korean politics, and
argues that these aspects remained almost unchanged during the period of
democratization. First, regional cleavage between the East (Youngnam) and
the West (Honam) is predominant over other cleavage structures such as
class, center-periphery, and religion in determination of the political support
market. Every candidate resorts to regional ties, betraying the political
pledge to eradicate the system of regional confrontation. Second, more often
than not, important political party decisions are in the hands of the charis-
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1 Three Kims indicate Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung, and Kim Jong Pil. They have domi-
nated Korean Politics for four decades since the military coup d’état of 1961.
matic leader, ignoring any opposition from younger members within the
party. The party system is so rigid as to suffocate new, young, and ambi-
tious members who are expected to renew it. Organizational democracy
inside the party has been substantially delayed under the strong presiden-
tial system (Przeworski et al., 1997, 2000). The strong presidential system
and the rigidity of party organization increased the difficulty in the repro-
duction of leadership, especially for the ruling party.
Third and lastly, the entrance barrier to the center of politics was high in
the system in which the political boss and his retainers monopolized the
power to select new-comers, to distribute important positions, and to decide
on the distribution of resources, including political funds and public invest-
ment. Despite a gradually increasing openness of the political system to out-
siders, and an increasing competitiveness of the political party system, it is
undeniable that the party system developed characteristics of a ‘cadre
party.’ It is interesting to observe that elite circles had been created and
strengthened by networking men of distinction, on the basis of regional,
educational, and social background. As in other capitalist societies, they cre-
ated so-called ‘gentlemen’s clubs’ in politics, economy, and society.
However, the exclusivity of the elite circles is especially conspicuous in
Korea (Choi, 2002). As Choi states, the exclusivity of elite circles and the
intensive networks among them trapped Korea’s democratization within a
conservative track.2
Thus, the natural extinction of the final boss in Korean politics enabled a
marginal politician, Roh Moo Hyun, to rise as a competitive and promising
candidate for presidency. He won a marginal victory by a 2.2% lead over
Lee Hoe Chang, who had held a strong lead throughout the last five years,
and was never doubted as next president.3 Roh Moo Hyun’s victory has
interesting implications on people’s expectations, voting behavior, and vot-
ers’ value systems. It means significant changes in all these. The election
outcome and voter distribution suggests a slight transformation of the
cleavage structure, as well as the political culture, in accordance with eco-
nomic and social development. In a word, the rise of the new leadership
was the outcome of the revolt of the young generation — the revolt against
the achievement and legacy of the old generation, i.e., state centrism,
growth-first ideology, and authoritarianism. It is noteworthy that the revolt
ignited a slight, but meaningful change of cleavage structure, especially of
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2 Because of this point, Choi defines Korea’s path as ‘conservative democratization.’ 
3 Roh Moo Hyun won with 48.9% of votes, and Lee Hoe Chang received 46.7% of the votes.
The voting rate was 71%.
regional confrontation. The analysis of voting behavior supports this argu-
ment.
According to analyses of exit polls conducted by major press and broad-
casting systems during the voting day, generation and schooling under-
mined the effect of regional confrontation between the East and the West,
which broke the tight balance between Roh and Lee to a degree. First,
regional cleavage turned out to be the strongest and most influential factor
in bifurcating the political support market between the East and the West.
Mr. Lee, candidate of the opposition party, won by a large margin in the
East, the origin of military dictatorship and conservative democratic leader-
ship. In contrast, Mr. Roh, candidate of the Democratic Party (Minjudang),
won by a large margin in the South-West, the foundation of the ruling party,
as well as Kim Dae Jung’s political leadership. It is worth noting that Mr.
Roh also received slightly greater support from the North-West region,
Seoul and Kyonggi-do, where almost half of Korea’s population is concen-
trated. Then, who voted for Mr. Roh in the North-West region particularly,
and across the East and the West in general? The answer lies in generation
and schooling.
Two figures regarding voter distributions by age and schooling are indica-
tive of the generational effect on politics. Figure 1 examines voter distribu-
tion by age, and shows that 20% more adults in their twenties and thirties
supported Mr. Roh over Mr. Lee. However, the pattern reverses with age, as
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more adults in their fifties and sixties supported Mr. Lee. In the age cohort
of the forties, voter distribution is almost evenly divided (see Figure 1). At
this point, it is important to recall the demographic change that age cohorts
of the twenties and the thirties occupy almost half of the entire voting popu-
lation (48%), and the share of voters in their fifties and the sixties was a
mere 29% in the last election. If the young generation is more educated than
the older generation, it is understandable why support for Mr. Roh appears
much stronger among those with higher education (see Figure 2).
Lee Hoe Chang is an experienced and well-qualified leader, capable of
representing the ruling class as well as the elite circles. He is an alumnus of
Kyonggi High School, the most distinguished high school during the old
era, and is also an alumnus of Seoul National University. It is said that ‘K-S
brand’ is the best passport to enter the elite circles in South Korea, similar to
Oxford-Cambridge Universities in Britain and Ivy League universities in the
United States. He was a respectable lawyer, the Chairman of the Board of
Audit and Inspection in the Kim Young Sam government, and former candi-
date competing with Kim Dae Jung. As such, how could Roh Moo Hyun,
graduate of a commercial high school, and with no record of higher educa-
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tion, beat him? Why did the younger and more educated generation uphold
Mr. Roh’s bid for President in a society long ruled by an elite circle? These
questions can be answered by highlighting fundamental changes in value
systems that were promoted by two simultaneous processes, democratization
and globalization, in South Korea. These will be discussed further in the next
section.
It is important to point out the essential feature of ‘cultural strife’ through
which the younger generation attempted to transform Korean politics by
constructing symbolic power. They projected their visions and aspirations
onto Roh Moo Hyun not because they liked him, but because he seemed
suitable for their purposes and more in line with their cultural tastes.
Endeavors of the older generation to maintain their influence by consolidat-
ing support for Mr. Lee instigated the younger generation’s projection of
Mr. Roh. The younger generation was convinced that their support for Roh
would undermine the domination of old-fashioned institutions and rules
inherited from the period of high-speed growth. The main purpose of cul-
tural strife is to overthrow the legacy of authoritarianism, cold war, and
growth-first ideology. It embraced free imagination and the uncurbed explo-
ration and future utilization of information technology (IT). The IT revolu-
tion in Korea brought forth an entirely new generation, complete with post-
material values and anti-traditional styles of thinking and acting in all
spheres of society (Inglehart, 1997). As Inglehart argues in his analysis, as
compared with those in other countries, the South Korean younger genera-
tion was surprisingly fast in accommodating post-material values, thus
widening the generational gap in terms of value systems. Did the younger
generation function as a generation in the presidential election? Did they
intentionally pursue a victory in the presidential election in order to achieve
a generational mission? Did they recognize ‘cultural strife’ at all? The
answer to these questions is ‘yes,’ at least when we observe what Nosamo
(the Organization That Loves Roh Moo Hyun) and other on-line communi-
ties supporting Mr. Roh had done over the period of election campaigns,
and also how three million young adults voted on election day.
The cultural strife that I define as the generational mission against the
legacy of high-speed growth has been accelerated by the information tech-
nology revolution in South Korea. South Korea is among the fastest nations
in constructing an information infrastructure and nurturing the capacity to
access global information technology. Internet users number 30 million, i.e.,
two-thirds of the entire population. This means that almost everyone, except
the elderly and children, knows how to use computers. Statistically, average
internet use is 14 hours weekly (see figure 3 for internet users by age). The
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IT revolution drastically altered life-styles, ways of thinking, and occupa-
tional choices, particularly for the younger generation.
First, the IT revolution provided the younger generation with diverse lad-
ders of success by creating new occupations, including computer designer,
computer programmer, fund manager, and venture capitalist. Chaebol firms
and other promising large firms are no longer sole career choices. The
altered preferences and diverse choices also gave rise to significant changes
in rules and customs governing jobs and the workplace. Life-long employ-
ment became obsolete, and loyalty to firm became an old-fashioned virtue.
Instead, workers are more inclined to take jobs in information technology
that allow free choice and that require innovative and creative thinking.
Their job attitudes have changed dramatically. In contrast, the older genera-
tion maintains life-long loyalty to its firms, and prefers work over leisure. 
Second, internet communication allows the younger generation to share
cultural tastes, sentiments, and sensitivity. It provides users with diverse
channels for communicating their opinions and developing tastes. Many
people with access to a variety of on-line communities enjoy collecting
information and exchanging opinions about special issues. In this sense, the
younger generation developed a wider channel to contact others than the
older generation had developed, since the latter lacked access to on-line
communities. In Mannheim’s terms, the IT revolution and internet commu-
nication enabled them to develop a generational style and a generational
consciousness (Mannheim, 1952). In a critical contingency such as a presi-
dential election, the generational style is apt to be used as a political mis-
sion. It is noteworthy that online communities play a crucial role in creating
a ‘public sphere’ in which most young people participate, in order to argue
and to state their opinions (Habermas, 1961, 1981). While street demonstra-
tions were the primary mechanism for the older generation to express their
opinions, varied methods and channels are widely open to the younger gen-
eration in internet space. The 2002 World Cup Soccer Games provided an
opportunity for the younger generation to mobilize their will to participate
in social and cultural affairs, and to express their cultural demands. The slo-
gan ‘Red Devils’ was the incarnation of generational aspirations and cultur-
al dynamics. Interestingly, the younger generation operated the internet
press and broadcasting station as an alternative to major presses.
Ohmynews.co.kr and Pressian.co.kr represent these alternatives that widened
and enriched the public sphere for criticizing the political society that was
governed by the old generation. It follows that two internet presses played a
crucial role in mobilizing young supporters for Mr. Roh.
Third, the public sphere in internet space filtered diverse opinions into a
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consistent argument that finally developed as a generational voice and aspi-
ration. Roh Moo Hyun’s candidacy was used as the platform on which to
break through political and social barriers that the old generation had
proudly constructed for economic growth. In this sense, Nosamo, one of the
young generation’s political and cultural online communities, succeeded in
transforming their will to real power by bringing Mr. Roh over to their side.
The eventual victory in the presidential election made it possible to combine
symbolic power with Realpolitik.
Finally, an election day event reveals the power and intensity of genera-
tional solidarity. As was widely reported, Mr. Roh faced a crisis engendered
by Chung Mong Jun’s sudden announcement to withdraw from the political
alliance with Roh, just hours prior to voting. Throughout the night and the
following day, most internet websites were full of emergency messages to
resolve the sudden crisis. It is illegal for any declaration of support or oppo-
sition of candidates to pass through press and internet space; however mes-
sages contained a code and connotation to induce the younger generation to
vote for Mr. Roh. It was estimated that some internet sites were interrupted
and broken down by 500,000 users’ simultaneous access, and that internet
access for that purpose accounted for three million accesses during the day.
This movement played a crucial, dual role in concentrating deviators to Mr.
Roh, and in raising the voting rate of the younger generation that was rela-
tively lower than the old generation’s. While the younger generation was
hastily carrying out these movements, the older generation felt comfortable
with the withdrawal of Chung Mong Jun, and was firmly convinced of
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FIGURE 3. INTERNET USER BY AGE.
Lee’s victory. Roh’s marginal victory of 2.2% was the outcome of internet
communication that mobilized generational solidarity.
On the night of the election, the young generation was extremely euphor-
ic, while the old generation was shocked. The shock on the first night
turned into panic and frustration. The ‘internet demonstration’ of the young
generation was so powerful that it precipitated the fall of the gentlemen’s
club from the center of politics and society (Song, 2003).
CHANGES OF VALUE SYSTEMS AND VOTER DISTRIBUTION 
South Korean value systems have undergone rapid change in accordance
with economic development and social differentiation. The 10,000 USD per
capita is not the crucial threshold, but implies a significant transformation in
life-style, work, and leisure. As was mentioned, the young generation had
quite different social, political, and economic backgrounds, due to the wave
of democratization and globalization in South Korea. The young generation
has enjoyed the benefits of democratization, and has acquired the rules of
survival in the midst of the pressures of globalization. Political freedom and
market competition became the essential core of their value system. Surveys
reveal the widening distance of value systems between the young and old
generations (ISDPR, 2002). First, the young generation has a deep contempt
for the exclusivity of the elite circles, based on academic careers and net-
works. They realize that serious social illness and inertia are associated with
these formal and informal ‘habits of the heart’ (Bellah, 1985). They want to
break the Korean habits of the heart that have strengthened social rigidity.
Anti-elitism occurred, and has been widely spreading among the young
generation that has to climb the intensively competitive ladder of success,
especially through schooling.
Second, anti-elitism promoted commoner-oriented sentiments in politics
and society. Anti-credentialism received wide repercussions from various
arenas of society. Two years ago, the Minister of Education carefully recom-
mended Chaebol firms and other public institutions not to consider educa-
tion in employing new personnel. Some radical columnists strongly argued
for the abolishment of Seoul National University, which stood at the apex of
discrimination based on schooling and educational ties. Anti-elitism has
become very persuasive, since the IT revolution removes educational premi-
ums, especially of graduates of colleges of arts and sciences.
Third, the young generation grew tired of the old generation’s pledge to
eradicate social ills and irrational customs, such as regional conflict, eco-
nomic inequality, and various discriminations, including anti-socialist and
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anti-labor ideology. Despite the efforts of two democratic governments to
improve rationality and eradicate old customs and thinking through vari-
ous measures of reform, the young generation remained discontented with
the old generation’s passive and conservative actions. Repeated failure to
satisfy popular expectations enraged the young generation, and fueled their
mistrust of the old generation.
Fourth, the young generation is extremely tired of ‘hard politics’ mainly
imposing obligations for successful reform. They want a transformation to
‘soft politics’ or ‘life politics,’ satisfying their demand for new issues that
include environmental and ecological issues, human rights, peace, and gen-
der equality. The demand for these issues is frequently expressed culturally
and by civil actions. Red Devils, candle demonstrations, and music festivals
are expressions of the young generation’s demand for ‘cultured politics.’ For
the young generation, Mr. Roh’s personal character radiates with these gen-
erational sentiments and with cultural sensitivity. This explains why photos
of Mr. Roh playing the guitar and buying garments in second-class depart-
ment stores were quite effective in mobilizing their support in the presiden-
tial campaign.
So far, all descriptions explain substantial changes in value systems, espe-
cially of the young generation toward post-materialism. Post-materialism
implies the preference of human rights, peace, self-realization, and the
desire for economic growth and security. As such, Mr. Roh’s pro-North
Korean attitude in declaring continuation of the ‘Sunshine Policy’ and in
repealing the National Security Law did not exert significant impact on his
support base. Conversely, his emphasis on South Korean independence vis-
à-vis the United States attracted the attention of young voters. The old gen-
eration’s concern with the rise of anti-Americanism did not beat young vot-
ers’ support in the election.
In this regard, the electoral opportunity structure that contributed to the
new leadership is best understood by illuminating the changes of value sys-
tems and political preferences among a young generation that consisted of
almost half of voters. Figure 4 illustrates the transformation of voter distrib-
ution that was influenced by the change of value systems (cf., Kitschelt,
1997). Up to the end of the 1980s, just around the beginning of democratiza-
tion, the locus of party competition was skewed towards Cold War and
materialist and traditional ideologies. As with the transition to democracy
and increasing globalization, competition rotated from an authoritarian-lib-
eral position to a post-material/liberal-material/authoritarian position. The
new diagonal axis reflects the diversified demand of voters for new issues.
Close observation of voting outcomes reveals that young voters under forty
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identify with the liberal/post-material position (a), voters in their forties
occupy the center position (b), and those in their fifties and sixties maintain
the authoritarian/materialist position (c). It is note-worthy that the majority
of voters from their twenties to forties are more aligned with liberal/post-
material values. These are the values to which Mr. Roh appealed.
PROFILES AND PROJECT OF THE NEW LEADERSHIP
Who are the power-brokers? What are they going to do? Are visions of
new leadership different from previous ones? They are definitely not.
However, the new leadership is different in terms of the shift of policy
weight to distribution and social welfare for lower classes. President Roh’s
actions are favorable for lower class and industrial workers. As a result,
business owners and the propertied upper class experience extreme tension
against Mr. Roh and TC. In the long-term, however, their worries and anxi-
ety may be needless, as President Roh could move to the center-right from
the center-left with the passage of time. Recurrent economic downturns
could press Roh’s government to release austere reform measures, as was
witnessed in Kim Dae Jung’s and Kim Young Sam’s governments.
Expectations are conflicting. Some complain about the negative effects of
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FIGURE 4. TRANSFORMATION OF VOTER DISTRIBUTION.
leftist-like and progressive policies, while others agree with the short-term
necessity of these policies. The question of what they will do can be
resolved by examining profiles of Roh’s support and advisory groups.
Supporting groups consist primarily of young men with a common back-
ground of student movements and democratic movements. They have typi-
cal career paths of the ‘386 generation,’ in Korean signifying those in their
thirties, and college cohorts of the 1980s.4 Leading figures among support-
ing groups include former presidents of student associations at prestigious
colleges, who had the common experience of serving in prison for the viola-
tion of the National Security Law. Many important Roh supporters were
leaders of student movements and democratic movements after graduation.
They tended to be progressive, pro-labor, and, in some instances, radical
reformists. It is not an exaggeration to state that they were purely theorists,
without sufficient experience with reform politics. Since experience does not
guarantee success in the politics of reform, we must wait for at least a year
for the most essential reform measures to be accomplished. These presiden-
tial aides of the 386 generation will be appointed as middle-ranked secre-
tariats in the Blue House.
The following examination is of advisory groups that consisted of approx-
imately one hundred intellectuals and university professors. Perhaps the TC
members reflected their beliefs, policy orientations, and critical conscious-
ness onto the Korean society. Eighteen core TC members reveal a surprising
consistency in policy orientation and their diagnosis/prescription of Korean
society and economy, although their backgrounds are slightly different.
One-half of TC members are professors of local universities. Two chiefs of
economic sections are well-known as labor economists focusing on worker
welfare and labor rights. While Professor Lee Jung-Woo, a Harvard Ph.D.
under Richard Freeman, emphasized worsening income inequality and
livelihood wages in his writings, Professor Kim Dae-Whan, an Oxford
Ph.D., focused on the effects of Chaebol’s discretionary measures on indus-
trial workers. They argue that neo-liberal policy measures such as lay-offs
and increased contingent workers are problematic, and that although work-
er flexibility is inevitable, it should be carefully and selectively applied.
Kim Young-Dae and Park Tae-Joo, in the social and cultural sections, are
more radical in stressing the improvement of tripartite commissions and
labor unions, both legally and politically. Chung Young-Ae, the deputy of
the Female Association in Chungcheongnam-do and a representative of
gender issues, stresses the introduction of legal measures protecting moth-
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4 Because of its character, Roh’s government is labeled a ‘386 regime.’
ers at work and eliminating discrimination against women. Professor Seong
Kyong-Ryung, a member of the Planning and Coordination Section of Roh’s
government, earned his Ph.D. from Stanford University under Professor
John Myles. He is well-known as an advocator of local autonomy and of the
transfer of the capital city for relieving population concentration. He also
favors improving social welfare, at least beyond the average level of eco-
nomic development. Professor Yoon Young-Kwan, chief of the diplomatic
and North Korean section, is a Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins University. He has
a moderate and balanced vision about pending issues, such as the North
Korean nuclear crisis. However, section members such as Seo Joo-Suk, Seo
Dong-Man, and Lee Jong-Suk emphasize independence and South Korean
self-identity in international relations. Professor Ihm Hyug-Baeg, chief of
the political reform project section and Ph.D. of the University of Chicago,
under Professor Adam Przeworski, works on the formulation of political
reform projects. Thus, TC is the amalgam of progressive intellectuals and
activists in civil social movements and labor movements.5 Interestingly, at
TC’s opening ceremony, President-elect Roh encouraged all these members
to disengage themselves from outside pressure and situational and condi-
tional difficulties.
Finally, approximately thirty assemblymen in the ruling party were Roh
supporters. They maintained solid support throughout the election cam-
paign, despite wavering approval ratings for Roh. This number is tanta-
mount to a mere one-third of all assemblymen in the ruling party, but will
constitute the core group when a new party emerges in the near future.
They have more commonalities than differences in terms of policy orienta-
tions, vision, and future direction for South Korea. Many of them were loyal
Kim Dae Jung followers, and did not hesitate in expressing loyalty to
President-elect Roh.
Acknowledging that these three groups constitute the core of the new
leadership unfortunately indicates the surprising weakness of Roh’s power
base. Their appointments to important positions in Roh’s government will
precipitate the fall of old elite groups, i.e., the current gentlemen’s clubs. It is
the first time that these elite groups will be excluded from designing a new
regime. Presumably, they may be waiting for the time when the new gov-
ernment seriously errs in inviting them back as state managers to ease social
discontent and frustration leveled at the new regime. Roh’s political power
is quite weak and fragile in this sense. However, for some time, he enjoys
strong support, especially from the lower and middle classes, industrial
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5 Half of TC members are appointed to important positions in the Roh government.
workers and people who feel marginal and alienated. Combining and con-
solidating their support is paramount for the success of Roh’s government.
Key goals for the Roh government are to promote social integration, and to
remedy social displacement by improving distributive justice and fulfilling
essential aspects of post-material values. According to a comparative analy-
sis of campaign pledges and candidates’ orientations, President-elect Roh’s
policy platform is outlined as follows (see Figure 5). Figure 5 summarizes
the results of survey analyses that measure the evaluation of 309 experts
regarding candidates’ positions on five issues. The relative positions of two
competing candidates, Mr. Roh and Mr. Lee, are in contrast. Mr. Roh earned
higher scores for political democracy, social reforms such as welfare, educa-
tion, and women issues, and the South-North dialogue, but much lower
scores for globalization and the economy. These scores provide an outline of
the policy orientations of Roh’s government. These policy orientations are
specified in greater detail as follows.
First, Roh’s government will introduce policy measures to improve dis-
tributive justice. Tax reform is inevitable for this purpose. While it will
increase taxes for the rich, including property tax, inheritance tax, transfer
income tax, and capital gain tax, various tax benefits will be offered to lower
classes and to the working poor. Since skyrocketing housing prices acceler-
ated economic inequality between the haves and the have-nots, heavy taxa-
tion has already begun to curb the housing market bubble. Housing markets
began to decline just after TC announced this measure. Inheritance taxes for
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Chaebol families were generally welcomed. However, these measures
resulted in freezing investments, consumption, and eventually the stock
market.
Second, Roh’s government will be highly tolerant of social welfare, espe-
cially for the middle and lower classes and the working poor. TC has
already announced a substantial expansion of poverty policies that were
introduced by the Kim Dae Jung government. Despite opposition from FKI
and KEF (Korean Employers Federation), TC has also decided to expand
social insurance to contingent workers who accounted for almost 52% of all
employees. The success of Roh’s government depends on the resolution of
the deficit of social insurance, such as pension and health insurance, with-
out triggering discontent about welfare cuts. President-elect Roh and his
advisory group will be faced with a profound dilemma between inclusive
policies and the pressures of cost containment.
Third, as President Roh and TC have repeatedly stressed, economic poli-
cies will not differ from those of the Kim Dae Jung government, although
the degree of implementation and inspection will be significantly strength-
ened. TC has emphasized transparency, fair transaction, prohibition of
mutual investment, managerial responsibility, and reduction of the debt
ratio. TC is extremely aware of owners’ powerful domination over affiliated
firms through mutual investment. Chaebol began to rationalize the firm
governance structure in order to comply with pressure from Roh’s govern-
ment. President-elect Roh firmly believes that rationalizing economy and
firm governance structure is prerequisite for economic growth. As such, reg-
ulating giant actors, i.e., Chaebol firms, is the most effective way to promote
market competition in the Korean context. Nevertheless, business is worried
about the absence of economic development and industrial policies in the
new leadership’s package.
Fourth, the Roh government inherits many social agendas awaiting fun-
damental reform from Kim Dae Jung’s government. Most social agendas
remain untouched or unfinished due to Kim’s primary attention on eco-
nomic recovery and dialogue with North Korea. President-elect Roh wants
to improve local autonomy by distributing administrative authority and
financial resources to local government. Transfer of the national capital to a
mid-province location is an ambitious design for the completion of local
autonomy. People desperately desire the Roh government to accomplish
educational reform that weaken school ties and alleviate private educational
costs, without repeating the failure of previous governments. Apparently,
Roh’s government would be faced with the dilemma between the need for
capable elites to lead IT and BT (Biology Techndogy) industries and popular
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sentiments against a social atmosphere based on academic careerism.
President-elect Roh pays extraordinary attention to industrial relations
reforms for two reasons. One reason is to induce foreign capital investment
that demands industrial peace and labor market flexibility. According to a
report of the Foreign Research Institute in 2000, South Korea was ranked
11th in the degree of labor market flexibility among 21 OECD countries
(OECD, 1999). However, this was due to higher rigidity among regular
workers and extreme flexibility among contingent workers. Thus, resolving
the insider-outsider segmentation is decisive for labor reform success (Song,
2001). While insiders want job security and oppose lay-off policies regard-
less of economic cycles, outsiders want to be regular workers and to be paid
wages equal to those of regular workers. Roh’s campaign pledge of ‘equal
pay for equal work’ will be seriously challenged by business and labor mar-
ket conditions.
President Roh expects the tripartite commission to deal with pending
issues regarding industrial relations, as well as with social and economic
agendas. However, there are contradictory contentions about the role and
political status of the tripartite commission. Businessmen argue for its aboli-
tion because of its initial absence, and bureaucrats view it as a useless orga-
nization that disturbs and competes with the policies of the various min-
istries. TC, as well as labor unions, would like to strengthen it as a substan-
tive organization, necessary for social dialogue. TC seriously considers
remodeling it on the model of the Tripartite Commission in Germany and
the Social and Economic Council (Sociaal-Economische Raad) in the
Netherlands. It is highly possible that TC, with its strong social democratic
orientation, will decide on the latter, despite severe opposition from busi-
ness and bureaucrats.
In sum, projects of Roh’s government are not significantly different from
those of Kim’s government, except for the transfer of policy focus to distrib-
ution and social justice. The two concepts seem inevitable in consideration
of social displacement and worsened economic inequality that were precipi-
tated by both the foreign debt crisis of 1997 and following neo-liberal poli-
cies under IMF pressure. However, it is difficult for the Roh government to
address the issues that the shift to ‘equality’ results in, such as the inevitable
sacrifice of either ‘state financial healthiness’ or ‘employment’ (Iversen and
Wren, 1998). What will be sacrificed does not depend on Roh’s preferences,
but on internal political challenges, international pressure, and the fate of
world economy.
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OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE: IS PARADIGMATIC SHIFT POSSIBLE?
The rise of new leadership reflects overall changes in value systems in
general and the aspirations of the younger generation to escape from tradi-
tional customs. South Korea is undergoing generational confrontation and
cultural strife that surround its shift to a more progressive ideology.
President Roh Moo Hyun is at the nucleus of symbolic and cultural power,
and his mission is to accomplish transformation in the arena of Realpolitik.
He carefully experiments in placing ambitious and talented supporters in
important positions in the Blue House and ministries. Their successful per-
formance remains uncertain. It is apparent that the new regime is not a rup-
ture, but a continuity of the Kim Dae Jung government in every respect.
Thus far, descriptions of the new government contain many symptoms
advocating a ‘paradigmatic shift’ of Korean politics and society to a new
space. These include new-comers to the power group and to the govern-
ment, the fall of old elite groups, ascendancy of progressive ideology, and
commoner-friendly leadership. Although these are not sufficient conditions
for confirming the paradigmatic shift, the revolt of the young generation
against old customs, old styles of thinking, and old patterns of state man-
agement is worthy of attention. If the Realpolitik does not allow new leader-
ship room to progress, the experiment for paradigmatic shift would result in
failure, although the ‘cultural shift’ would wait for another experiment.
The success of this paradigmatic shift relies on political and social move-
ment toward substantive democracy. Although South Korea already passed
the transition to democracy and entered the phase of democratic consolida-
tion, heated conflict concerning ‘which democracy’ has disturbed social and
political development (Song, 1999; Kim, 2001; Schmitter and Karl, 1991).
While economic performance promotes democratization, democratic consol-
idation is largely dependent upon social performance. Social performance
requires capable state managers who have experience with policy design
and crisis management. Policy shift to distributive justice is apt to bring
about serious problems in state finance and economic growth. Although the
shift of Roh’s government is similar to the German social democratic experi-
ment, Roh should be aware that uncurbed unemployment eventually dis-
turbed the ambitious 1997 ‘Employment Solidarity’ of Schroeder’s govern-
ment. As demonstrated in advanced countries, cost containment and dis-
tributive justice are not harmonious.
Further, there are traditional but serious barriers to the success of social
performance. First, policy design and implementation have been much too
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dependent on the bureaucracy. This bureaucracy has enjoyed relative auton-
omy vis-à-vis politics, despite regime change, as their tenure is permanent
as compared with that of political power groups. Reform policies are prone
to be distorted and assume different shapes due to the diversified interests
of ministries. Incorporating bureaucracy into reform coalition is important
for the success of political reform. Similarly, defending against conservative
attacks and remedying the damage done by reform policy is also critical for
social performance. Management of both the expected aftermath and the
‘unexpected consequences’ is an essential part of policy design prior to
implementation.
Third, consolidation and expansion of reform coalition is especially cru-
cial for the Roh government, since its power base is extraordinarily weak
and fragile. President-elect Roh is surrounded with a series of political chal-
lenges. The ruling party is crippled with the internal cleavage between pro-
Roh and anti-Roh groups that was engendered during the presidential cam-
paign. Restructuring the ruling party or establishing a new party in prepa-
ration for the general election of 2004 must be decided on. Managing the
veto power of the opposition party, which is the majority party in the
National Assembly, is an urgent task for Roh. Finally, greater political sup-
port from the East is also crucial in improving the legitimacy of his regime,
as regional confrontation will remain a stronger factor than demographic
effects in determining presidential leadership.
It is ironic to observe that reform politics during the previous two govern-
ments were detrimental to the expansion of reform coalition. Due to increas-
ing social disruption and discontent, people deserted leadership. Although
the decline of leadership popularity is not unique to South Korea, its steep-
ness is rarely observed in other countries. In order to avoid the trap formed
by gradual cleavage in reform coalition and rapidly declining popularity, it
is important to design social policies that do not exceed the capacities of the
ruling party, and to induce the cooperation of the opposition party.
However, political cooperation is rarely observed in a presidential system
that has blocked the opposition party from participating in the government
(Lijphart, 1992). As such, how is paradigmatic shift possible? To accomplish
this, President-elect Roh takes great effort in developing new possibilities.
Experiments have already begun, but a great ordeal awaits him and South
Korea.
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